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introduction: Failure Mode Effects and Criticalities Analysis (FMECA) represents a 
prospective method for risk assessment in complex medical practices. Our objective 
was to describe the application of FMECA approach to intraoperative electron beam 
radiotherapy (IOERT), delivered using a mobile linear accelerator, for the treatment of 
early breast cancer as an anticipated boost.
materials and methods: A multidisciplinary Working Group, including several different 
professional profiles, was created before the beginning of clinical practice in 2012, with 
the purpose of writing the Flow Chart and applying the FMECA methodology to IOERT 
procedure. Several criticalities were identified a priori in the different steps of the pro-
cedure and a list of all potential failure modes (FMs) was drafted and ranked using the 
risk priority number (RPN) scoring system, based on the product of three parameters: 
severity, occurrence, and detectability (score between 1 and 5). The actions aimed at 
reducing the risk were then defined by the Working Group and the risk analysis was 
repeated in 2014 and in 2016, in order to assess the improvement achieved.
Results: Fifty-one FMs were identified, which represented the issues prospectively 
investigated according to the FMECA methodology. Considering a set threshold of 30, 
the evaluated RPNs show that 33 out of 51 FMs are critical; 6 are included in the mod-
erate risk class (RPN: 31–40); 16 in the intermediate risk class (RPN: 41–50), and 11 in 
the high risk class (RPN: >50).
discussion: The most critical steps concerned the surgical procedure and IOERT set-up. 
The introduction of the corrective actions into the clinical practice achieved the reduction 
of the RPNs in the re-analysis of the FMECA worksheet after 2 and 4 years, respectively.
Conclusion: FMECA proved to be a useful tool for prospective evaluation of potential 
failures in IOERT and contributed to optimize patient safety and to improve risk manage-
ment culture among all the professionals of the Working Group.
Keywords: risk assessment, intraoperative electron beam radiotherapy, quality assurance, FmeCa, patient safety
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intRoduCtion
Adjuvant radiotherapy (RT) after breast conservative surgery 
is currently considered the standard treatment for early breast 
cancer and plays an important role to reduce local recurrences 
(LR) and to improve disease-free and overall survival (1).
Taking into consideration that around 85% of ipsilateral 
breast cancer recurrences occur in the tumor bed, a local dose 
escalation is commonly used in addition to whole breast irra-
diation (2). Three randomized trials have demonstrated that 
the addition of a boost to the tumor bed reduces further the 
incidence of LR (3, 4).
Intraoperative electron beam radiotherapy (IOERT) in the 
treatment of early-stage breast cancer was introduced into the 
clinical practice at the end of the 1990s, when dedicated mobile 
linear accelerators (linacs) became available (5). It can be used 
both as elective RT (partial breast irradiation) in selected patients 
(6) and as an anticipated boost (7). In this case, it shortens the 
total radiation treatment time by 1–1.5 weeks and improves the 
precision of dose delivery to the tumor bed (3, 7).
Our Center acquired a mobile electron linac MOBETRON by 
IntraOp dedicated to IOERT, and our clinical activity started at 
the end of June 2012.
The risk assessment performed before the start of clinical activ-
ity was integrated with the prospective method FMECA (Failure 
Mode Effects and Criticalities Analysis). Two and four years later, 
an analysis of all the relevant criticalities was performed in order 
to improve quality.
One possible approach to prevent failure mode (FM) in IOERT 
session consists in fact in the identification and prevention of pos-
sible hazards a priori (8, 9).
The aim of this study is to present the results of the method 
elaborated by our Working Group and the application of FMECA 
prospective approach to IOERT procedure.
mateRiaLs and metHods
A multidisciplinary Working Group was created before the 
beginning of clinical practice with IOERT in 2012, according to 
the Guidelines for Quality Assurance in Intraoperative Radiation 
Therapy by the Superior Institute of Health (10), including several 
different professional profiles: a Surgeon, a Radiation Oncologist, 
a Physicist, an Anesthesiologist, the Chief of the RT techni-
cians, and the Nurse Responsible for the Operating Block. The 
Group was coordinated by a facilitator, a Medical Doctor from 
the Medical Direction of the Hospital, qualified in clinical risk 
management, skilled in risk analysis, but not expert in radiation 
therapy.
At first, the Procedure text was elaborated, according to the 
Joint Commission International (JCI) method (11), followed in 
our Hospital, with the contribution of all the members of the 
Working Group, who periodically met with the facilitator.
The description of the Flow Chart of IOERT (Table  1), 
included in the Procedure text, made up the platform of the 
FMECA investigation.
Each member of the Working Group was asked to identify 
a priori the criticalities he/she might meet in the process steps 
concerning his/her specific activity. In this way, a list of all poten-
tial FMs occurring in each process step was drafted.
FMECA leads to quantitative data: for every step of IOERT 
procedure a score is assigned. The score ranges from 1 to 5 and 
includes three pre-established parameters:
 – severity (S),
 – occurrence (O),
 – detectability (D).
In clinical practice, FMECA consists in the identification of 
different steps of the examined procedure (12). For each step, pos-
sible critical situations are identified and a risk priority number 
(RPN) is assigned. RPN value is obtained by multiplying S, O, and 
D parameters (RPN = S × O × D) (score between 1 and 5 assigned 
following rules) (Table 2).
The higher the value obtained, the more likely the risk that an 
accident occurs (“failure”) during the procedure and the higher 
the probability of relevant consequences are.
Based on calculated RPN, four different “risk classes” are 
identified:
 – low risk (RPN ≤30),
 – moderate risk (RPN 31–40),
 – intermediate risk (RPN 41–50),
 – high risk (RPN >50).
Thus, the identification of the critical steps of a procedure 
leads to modifications, even of substantial nature, of behavior and 
actions in order to reduce errors occurrence as much as possible. 
Decreasing this hazard also leads to the reduction of possible 
damage both for health personnel and patients.
The risk analysis was completed by asking the members of the 
team to evaluate the RPN of each FM.
Every 2 years since the beginning of IOERT clinical activity, 
the risk analysis was repeated by the Working Group in order to 
assess the improvement achieved.
ResuLts
Our activity with IOERT as an anticipated boost, followed by 
conventional or hypofractionated external beam RT, in the treat-
ment of early breast cancer started in June 2012.
Ninety-two cases have been treated up to April 2016 (46 by the 
end of 2014 and an additional 40 by the end of 2016).
The first FMECA analysis was performed before the start of 
clinical activity; the risk analysis was then repeated at the end of 
2014 and again at the end of 2016.
In the Flow Chart, the IOERT process was subdivided into 
39 steps, in which the different professional figures are involved, 
from the start-up of the Mobetron to the end of the operation, 
the switch off of the machine and the draft of the IOERT report 
(Table 1).
An Excel worksheet was created, inserting in rows: process 
step, professional figures involved, FM, potential effects of failure, 
potential causes of failure, initial risk ranking with the RPN, and 
corrective actions. In the re-analysis of the process—2 and 4 years 
taBLe 1 | FLOW CHART: processes identified in intraoperative electron beam radiotherapy (IOERT) treatment in Trieste.
Phases Professional figures Procedure initial risk 
ranking
Revised 
risk ranking 
2013–2014
Final revised 
risk ranking 
2015–2016
Risk priority 
number (RPN)
RPN RPN
1 Physicist MOBETRON transfer, start-up and warm-up 45 5 5
30 10 10
36 24 24
2 Physicist MOBETRON daily Mechanical check 30 10 10
3 Physicist MOBETRON daily dosimetric quality control 60 30 5
4 Nurse of the operating room Set-up of dedicated IOERT operating table and immobilization device 24 4 4
5 Nurse of the operating room Preparation of IOERT instruments 12 2 2
6 Anesthesiologist Quality control of the anesthesiology instruments 12 2 2
16 4 4
7 Anesthesiologist Patient monitoring and camera functionality start-up 12 2 2
16 4 4
8 Nurse of the recovery room Patient recovery 12 3 3
8 2 2
12 3 3
9 Nurse of the operating room Patient transfer on IOERT operating table 60 30 10
10 Surgeon Surgical procedure and margin check 45 10 10
11 Surgeon–Nurse of the  
operating room
Delivery of the specimen of quadrantectomy to the  
Pathmology Department and margin assessment
60 
80
10 
10
  5 
  5
12 Surgeon Margin assessment communication 45 10 10
13 Surgeon Preparation of the breast flap 60 10 10
14 Radiation Oncologist–Surgeon Definition of clinical target volume 64 16 16
15 Radiation Oncologist–Surgeon Target thickness evaluation 48 24 4
16 Radiation Oncologist Applicator and shielding disk selection 36 8 8
17 Radiation Oncologist Dose prescription 45 20 20
Beam energy selection 45 20 20
18 Physicist Gafchromic film for in vivo dosimetry preparation 60 32 4
19 Radiation Oncologist–Surgeon Applicator placement 64 36 24
20 Radiation Oncologist–Surgeon Shielding disk and applicator alignment 80 60 30
21 Radiation oncologist–Surgeon Applicator connection with docking mirror and support 27 9 9
22 Nurse of the Operating room Operating table and surgical theater protection with sterilized cover 45 15 15
23 Anesthesiologist Movement of operating table and anesthesiologist  
instruments toward the MOBETRON 
30 5 5
24 Radiotherapy (RT) technician Alignment between applicator and MOBETRON gantry 45 30 30
25 RT technician SOFT-DOCKING 45 10 5
45 45 30
26 Physicist Operating room exit 27 12 12
27 Physicist Mobile shielding set-up 12 6 6
28 Physicist Monitor unit calculation 45 10 10
29 RT technician Data entry 45 20 20
30 RT technician Physical delivery of radiation dose (start button pressed) 48 24 24
31 Anesthesiologist Anesthesiologist monitoring during irradiation 36 24 24
32 Physicist Confirmation of dose delivery 60 20 20
33 Physicist Shielding removal 12 6 6
34 RT technician MOBETRON removal from the operating table 45 30 30
35 Radiation Oncologist–Surgeon Removal of all IOERT devices 8 2 2
36 Surgeon Check of treatment area 20 5 5
37 Radiation Oncologist– 
Surgeon–Physicist–RT technician
Treatment recording, reporting (in patient report) and signing 36 8 8
38 RT technician MOBETRON transfer in the pretreatment area and machine switchoff 36 24 24
39 Medical Physics and  
Clinical Engineering Departments
Machine maintenance 24 12 8
3
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taBLe 2 | Risk Analysis.
severity (s) occurrence (o) detectability (d)
1. No damage 1. Extremely unlikely 1. Almost always detected
2. Minimal damage 2. Low probability 2. Great probability to be 
detected
3. Moderate damage 
in the short term
3. Moderate probability, it 
occasionally occurs
3. Moderate probability to 
be detected
4. Main damage in 
the long term
4. Great probability, it 
repeatedly occurs
4. Low probability to be 
detected
5. Permanent 
damage
5. Very high probability, 
almost inevitable
5. Very low probability to be 
detected, remote
4
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later—the final RPN was elaborated and the risk reduction (RR) 
(preliminary RPN—final RPN) was also calculated in order to 
assess the weight of the corrective measures.
In this worksheet, 51 FMs were identified, which represented 
the issues prospectively investigated according to the FMECA 
method.
Considering a set threshold of 30, the evaluated RPNs show 
that 33 out of 51 FMs are critical; 6 are included in the moderate 
risk class (RPN: 31–40); 16 in the intermediate risk class (RPN: 
41–50), and 11 in the high risk class (RPN: >50).
Failure modes included in the high risk class (Table 3) enabled 
us to pinpoint the main criticism of the whole IOERT procedure 
and so we were able to make procedural changes in order to 
reduce hazards. The data highlight the fact that several critical 
steps concern the surgical procedures and IOERT set-up.
disCussion
The analysis of adverse events in RT is a recent topic; either 
retrospective or prospective approaches can be employed. In the 
former group, the root cause analysis is the most widely used, 
aimed at identifying the root causes of near misses or adverse 
events; in the latter group, several methodologies are available, 
such as process mapping, value stream mapping, fault tree analysis 
and failure mode effects and criticality analysis (FMECA) (12). A 
proactive approach allows to study the whole process or part of it, 
independently from the occurrence of an adverse event, to imple-
ment the corrective actions and to evaluate the benefits obtained; 
it is, therefore, more suitable to a complex process, such as IOERT.
Analyzing the high risk class steps of our procedure in 
chronological order (Table  3), the first phase with a high risk 
score (RPN = 60) concerns the Physicist who is in charge of the 
program of quality control (FMECA step No. 3).
During the pre-clinical quality control, the FM was due to 
the incorrect measurement and/or reading of the pre-established 
parameters, which might cause the delivery of a wrong dose to the 
patient. The precise observation of the Quality Control Protocol 
at first (RR: 30; 50%) and then a wider experience of the operator 
(RR: 25; 83.3%) could avoid this serious occurrence.
The second criticality involves the nurses of the Operating 
Theater (step No. 9): it concerns the incorrect positioning of the 
patient on the operating table with the danger of slipping or fall-
ing off (RPN = 60). The adherence to the well-known Policies and 
Procedures of our Hospital (RR: 30; 50%) and the training of the 
nursing staff acquired over time (RR: 20; 66.7%) could prevent 
these accidents.
In the FMECA analysis, a high score was also assigned to the 
phase No. 11, which involves both the operating room Nurses 
and the Surgeon; it regards the delivery of the specimen of 
quadrantectomy to the Pathology Department and the margins 
assessment with a macroscopic evaluation performed by the 
Pathologist.
Assuming that the patient identification (step No. 11a; 
RPN = 60) has been properly done during the “time out” phase 
(before the surgical procedure begins) (final RPN: 5), the main 
debated issues are as follows: the way to communicate sensitive 
data (by phone), the amount of time to obtain the results, and the 
right evaluation of the Pathologist report. Time delay for surgical 
specimen examination may vary from 15 to 30 min due to the 
time for mammographic/ultrasound evaluation of the specimen, 
sample processing, and caseload of the Pathologists.
A wrong identification of the margin (step No. 11b; RPN = 80) 
could cause an incorrect choice of the surgical procedure; the risk 
of local failure in fact is reported to be higher in case of positive or 
close margins (13) and, in this case, the Surgeon can widen them 
during the same surgical procedure.
We identified and selected a group of Pathologists specialized 
and dedicated to breast tumors, with the aim to reduce this risk 
ranking. As regards sensitive data communication, a specific 
procedure was established: data need to be communicated by 
phone from a physician to another physician and the colleague 
who receives the communication has to print the online report in 
order to have an official written document (final RPN: 5).
Step No. 13 involves the Surgeon (RPN = 60) and the correct 
preparation of the breast flap in order to prevent that a devital-
ized tissue could cause necrosis and postoperative morbidity. 
An accurate visual control during the surgical procedure could 
decrease the risk (RR: 50; 83.3%).
Step No. 14 regards the definition of the clinical target volume 
(CTV) (RPN = 64). This represents a critical point involving the 
Radiation Oncologist and the Surgeon: underdosing of the target 
and/or unintended normal tissues irradiation can occur (14). The 
exact evaluation of the dimensions of the tumor on preoperative 
diagnostic imaging and an accurate intraoperative definition of 
the CTV determined a significant RPN reduction from 64 to 16 
(RR: 48; 75%).
Another relevant criticality (step No. 18) involves the Physicist 
and the preparation of the gafchromic film for in vivo dosimetry 
(RPN = 60). A wrong calibration of the gafchromic film or an 
inadequate placement of the film on top of the internal shield can 
cause a wrong evaluation of the dose delivered (14). These risks 
were prevented first of all by following the “in vivo dosimetry” 
Procedure, elaborated by the Physicist, with an RPN reduction 
from 60 to 32 (RR: 28; 46.7%), and then by labeling the gafchro-
mic film and employing a double check in the procedure with a 
further reduction of RPN from 32 to 4 (RR: 28; 87.5%).
The next critical score (step No. 19) is related to the inaccurate 
placement of the applicator in the tumor bed (RPN = 64).
Absent or incomplete adherence of the applicator to the tumor 
bed, determined by air gap presence, blood accumulation, or very 
curved tumor bed, can cause a non-homogeneous irradiation 
taBLe 3 | FMECA worksheet: high risk class steps.
Phases Professional 
figures
Procedure Failure mode Failure effects Failure causes initial risk ranking Corrective 
actions 
2013–2014
Revised risk 
ranking 
Corrective  
actions  
2015–2016
Final revised risk 
ranking
S O D Risk priority 
number  
(RPN)
S O D RPN S O D RPN
3 Physicist Pre treatment  
quality 
control and 
authorization
Wrong measure, 
insertion or  
reading of a 
delivery  
parameter
Wrong delivered 
dose
Violation of 
protocol limits  
for quality  
assurance
5 3 4 60 Adherence to 
instructions in 
quality assurance 
protocol
5 2 3 30 Adherence to 
instructions in 
quality assurance 
protocol—wider 
experience
5 1 1 5
9 Nurse Patient 
positioning  
on the operating 
table
Patient 
displacement
Patient 
displacement, 
slipping and  
fall off
Non-adherence 
to guidelines/
protocol
5 4 3 60 Adherence to 
Hospital Policies 
and Procedures
5 2 3 30 Adherence to 
Hospital Policies  
and Procedures—
wider experience
5 1 2 10
11 Surgeon– 
Nurse
Delivery of 
surgical  
specimen to the 
Pathology and/
or Radiology 
Department
Transcription  
error
Wrong patient 
identification
Wrong  
therapeutic 
decision
Communication 
defect
Communication 
defect
5
5
4
4
3
4
60
80
Procedure 
adherence
Surgeon 
confirmation 
required
5
5
2
2
1
1
10
10
Procedure 
adherence-wider 
experience
Procedure 
adherence-wider 
experience
5
5
1
1
1
1
5
5
13 Surgeon Breast flap 
preparation
Tissue 
devitalization
Post operatory 
morbidity-
reintervention
Fat necrosis 5 4 3 60 Careful visual 
control of tissue 
vitality
5 2 1 10 Careful visual  
control of tissue 
vitality
5 2 1 10
14 Radiation 
Oncologist–
Surgeon
Treatment area 
definition
Wrong treatment 
area definition
Wider or smaller 
treated area
Wrong visual 
evaluation of the 
tumor bed to be 
irradiated 
4 4 4 64 Preventive 
evaluation of 
tumor dimensions 
(Mammography, 
Ultrasound, MRI); 
intraoperative 
evaluation
4 2 2 16 Preventive  
evaluation of 
tumor dimensions 
(Mammography, 
Ultrasound, MRI); 
intraoperative 
evaluation
4 2 2 16
18 Physicist Preparation of 
gafchromic film 
and placement 
on the shielding 
disk
(1) Inadequate 
placement
(2) Wrong 
calibration, 
use, conser-
vation of the 
gafchromic 
film
Wrong measure 
of the delivered 
dose
Wrong 
observance 
of the “in vivo 
dosimetry” 
procedure
4 3 5 60 Observance of the 
“in vivo dosimetry” 
procedure
4 2 4 32 Observance of the 
“in vivo dosimetry” 
procedure,  
labeling of the 
gafchromic film  
and double check
4 1 1 4
19 Radiation 
Oncologist–
Surgeon
Applicator 
placement
Absent or 
incomplete 
adherence of the 
applicator to the 
tumor bed
Non-
homogeneous 
irradiation
Air gap 
presence, blood 
accumulation, 
very curved 
tumor bed 
4 4 4 64 Accurate visual 
control, correct 
placement of the 
patient on the 
operating table
4 3 3 36 Accurate visual 
control, correct 
placement of the 
patient on the 
operating table, 
double check
4 3 2 24
(Continued )
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(14). Corrective actions, such as an accurate visual control and the 
correct placement of the patient on the operating table, reduced 
the risk ranking from 64 to 36 (RR: 28; 43.8%) after 2 years and 
from 36 to 24 in the next 2 years (RR: 12; 33.3%) employing a 
double check.
The highest step score (No. 20) (RPN = 80) was attributed to 
the misalignment of the shielding disk, used to protect the normal 
tissues underneath the target volume, such as the lung and the 
heart (for the left breast). The disk is positioned by the Surgeon 
between the residual breast and the pectoralis fascia, its size 
depending on the collimator diameter chosen for the treatment 
(Figure 1).
In most of the cases, we employed an 8-cm-diameter shielding 
disk provided by the IntraOp, made up of three stacked layers: a 
5 mm polymethyl methacrylate (PMMA), a 3 mm copper, and a 
2 mm PMMA layer (Figure 2).
The low accuracy in the alignment of the disk would cause the 
delivery of an excess of dose to the underlying normal tissues.
The selection of a plate much larger than the applicator size 
was the first corrective action.
Furthermore, to avoid shielding disk misalignment, the Surgeon 
and the Radiation Oncologist decided to design a new shield-
ing set-up, implementing an elastic band fixed by stitches to the 
pectoralis fascia, thus preventing the disk slipping (14) (Figure 3).
The optimized set-up described above was introduced into 
the clinical practice, and a RR from 80 to 60 (RR: 20; 25%) was 
observed in the first re-analysis of the procedure in 2014.
In 2015, intraoperative ultrasound (IOUS) measures were 
employed either to better define the target thickness or to check 
the position of the shielding disk. IOUS proved to be accurate in 
evaluating both target thickness and shielding alignment, halving 
the RPN (RR from 48 to 24 in the former case and from 60 to 30 
in the latter case).
The last high risk step in the FMECA worksheet (RPN = 60) 
concerns the Physicist and the verification a posteriori of the 
FiGuRe 1 | Disk placement behind a patient’s breast parenchyma before 
IOERT.
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parameters of the delivered dose (step No. 32). The constant 
use of the check list and a double check by the Physicist and the 
Radiation Oncologist contributed to decrease the RPN from 60 
to 20 (RR: 40; 66.7%).
Only two studies published in the literature examined the 
importance of FMECA applied to IOERT procedure: in the 
Italian experience a dedicated mobile Linac was used (8), while 
in the Spanish analysis the irradiation was performed with a fixed 
conventional Linac (9). In both studies, FMECA proved to be 
an excellent tool to evaluate patient safety and allowed to reduce 
risks and improve quality in IOERT procedure. Ciocca et al. (8) 
found that the highest risk was associated with the alignment of 
the shielding disc, as we observed in this study (Table 3). López-
Tarjuelo et al. (9) found that the highest ranked RPNs were related 
not only to incorrect protection assembly but also to incorrect 
transmission and programming of treatment parameters. In our 
analysis, incorrect monitor unit calculation and data entry (step 
No. 28 and No. 29) (Table  1) had an initial intermediate risk 
score, which decreased to a low score after the introduction of 
the corrective actions, while only the verification a posteriori of 
the delivered dose (step No. 32) was initially classified in the high 
risk class, as reported above.
ConCLusion
Intraoperative radiation treatment as an anticipated boost proved 
to be very effective in the treatment of early breast cancer.
This approach presents several advantages:
 – No topographic miss,
 – More favorable radiobiology of a single dose (α/β),
 – Shorter radiation time (<1–2 weeks),
 – Good dose distribution,
 – Complete skin sparing,
 – Minimal toxicity in the long-term follow-up.
On the other side, it reveals some drawbacks:
 – Uncertainty of the final pathologic report and
 – Lack of definition of the resection margins.
To date, every published interim analysis showed lower local 
recurrence rates than standard treatment schedules (7). In our 
experience, no local or regional recurrences were detected, with a 
median follow-up of 28 months, and the incidence and severity of 
the side effects were acceptable; no grade 3 or greater side effects 
were observed.
The FMECA has provided a prospective systematic method 
to discover potential failures in IOERT procedure: evaluating not 
only the frequency of FM but also their severity and detectability, 
it has given a more complete assessment of the risk. It contributes, 
therefore, to optimize patient safety right from the start of our 
clinical activity and to improve risk management culture among 
all the professionals involved in the Working Group.
The IOERT procedure was standardized and the application of 
FMECA allowed us to define the safest pathway for the patient.
Its use, still rather limited, should be strongly encouraged in 
RT Centers treating patients with IOERT.
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